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The Hires decision is both a logical development of Israel
and a desirable attitude for the courts to take. X sues A and
is denied recovery because of his own contributory negligence. If
X subsequently sues B, a joint tort-feasor, B should be permitted
to assert collateral estoppel to defeat the action. This follows
only if the contributory negligence in the first action is identical
to the contributory negligence that would be shown in the second
action. 95 It is apparent that plaintiff has had his day in court
on the issue of contributory negligence. Thus, there seems to be
no reason for not expanding the scope of the Israel decision to
situations of this type.
ARTICLE

44-TRiAL MOTIONS

CPLR 4404(b):

Codefendants do not have standing to set
verdict aside.
In an unreported decision, the jury returned a verdict against
defendants Petroff and Miszuk and in favor of defendant Brzezinski.
The trial court, upon a motion by the codefendants Petroff and
Miszuk, set aside all the verdicts, solely upon a determination
that the verdict in favor of Brzezinski was contrary to the weight
of the evidence.
In Petroff v. Brzezinski,19 the appellate division, fourth
department, interpreting CPLR 4404, reversed and reinstated the
original verdict. The court held that although the verdict in favor
of Brzezinski was contrary to the weight of the evidence, his codefendants had no standing to move to
set the verdict aside
197
"because they were not his adversaries."
It should be noted that the refusal of the court to hear the
motion defeats the codefendants' possible right to contribution
under CPLR 1401. Thus, Petroff and Miszuk are "aggrieved" to
the extent that they lose the chance to reduce their damages. They
121, 150 (1966).

However, this case has been reversed by the Court of

Appeals, and will be treated in the next issue of the Survey.
195

See also Friedman v. Parklane Motors, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 262,

238 N.Y.S2d 973 (1st Dep't 1963). The court permitted the defensive
assertion of collateral estoppel, after it had been established in a previous
action against a party not in privity with the defendant therein that plaintiff's
intestate's injuries had not been caused by the accident.
90624 App. Div. 2d 1072, 265 N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 1965).
197 Petroff v. Brzezinski, 24 App. Div. 2d 1072, 1073, 265 N.Y.S.2d 804,
806 (4th Dep't 1965). Accord, Schultz v. Alfred, 11 App. Div. 2d 266,

203 N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dep't 1960); Hughes v. Parkhurst, 284 App. Div.
757, 134 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1954).
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are placed at the mercy of the plaintiff who may, at his option,
object to the verdict or accept it.9 s
ARTICLE

51

-

ENFORCEMENT

OF

JUDGMENTS

AND

ORDERs GENERALLY

CPLR 5101: Court still has implied power to grant stays.
CPA § 1520 provided that the non-payer of motion and other
interlocutory costs was subject to an automatic stay of all proceedings on his part, except to review or vacate the order.
CPLR 5101, which superseded CPA § 1520, omitted any mention of automatic stays as a means of enforcing payment of motion
costs. 19 It was held, however, in Associated Sales Analysts, Inc.
v. Weitz, 00° that the implied, discretionary power to grant stays
for nonpayment of costs in prior actions was not nullified by this
omission.
There are text writers who conflict with the court's interpretation of the legislative intent in omitting that portion referring
to automatic stays in the CPLR. 201 It is their opinion that with
execution available under Article 52, a stay of proceedings was
entirely unwarranted as an additional method of enforcing the
payment of motion costs.20 2 While there is some language to this
effect in the Fourth Report of the Advisory Committee,20 3 there is
no further mention made in any of the subsequent reports.20 4 The
court, however, reasoned that the incomplete legislative history,
which dealt only with interlocutory costs, was insufficient to
support the conclusion that the discretionary power to stay subsequent actions, a common-law power predating the mandatory
stay provisions of the older statutes, 20 5 had been nullified. The
court further reasoned that although execution might prove unsatisfactory, an irresponsible litigant might nevertheless continue
to harass his adversary. Finally, the court noted that unlimited
198 See
L.Q. 269,
analogous
feasors.
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266 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
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CPA § 1520, which was preceded by RCP 74.

